S5E7. What Trump's victory means for the Balkans
S5E7. What Trump's victory means for the Balkans
The return of the former U.S. President to the White House is likely to strengthen nationalist leaders in the region, and pose risks of a new wave of instability and non-transparent private interests
Dear reader,
welcome back to BarBalkans, the newsletter with blurred boundaries.
Donald Trump won.
This bears repeating, even more than a week after one of the most consequential elections for the future of the entire world. Yes, this is real: he will soon return to the White House, four years after his first term ended.
Trump’s comeback introduces unprecedented unpredictability in the strategic positioning of the world’s leading power.
His tendency toward isolationism raises concerns over potential trade conflicts with China and escalating tensions with Europe. His affinity for authoritarian leaders suggests he will likely align with similar political figures.
The peace he promises is far from impartial. His inclination to disengage from Ukraine does not ease the persistent friction between Washington and Moscow. Meanwhile, there are no signs of any reduction in U.S. military support for Israel or involvement in the Palestinian genocide.
In truth, Trump’s motivations seem driven by personal interests and a close circle of loyalists—including Elon Musk, who can now be considered the first true U.S. oligarch.
Whether we fully grasp it or not, Trump’s return to power makes the world a less stable place. The Balkans are no exception.
A fuse for the nationalists
Much has been written in recent weeks about what Trump’s return to the White House means. Today, BarBalkans will explore the implications for the Balkan region, focusing on the interplay of nationalism and private interests.
First of all, it is worth examining the new impetus that the U.S. President-elect is likely to inspire in nationalist leaders across the region.
Although it is almost impossible to predict his future strategies, Trump is expected to prioritize political and commercial confrontation with China, seek an understanding with Putin’s Russia on Ukraine, and solidify the alliance with Israel.
Europe will likely become the sacrificial victim of this policy. A weakened relationship between Washington and Brussels would grant greater room for nationalist, secessionist, and expansionist agendas in the Western Balkans, increasing the risk of renewed ethnic tensions.
This is the case of the President of Republika Srpska (the Serb-majority entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) Milorad Dodik. Celebrating Trump’s victory, the Bosnian Serb leader declared that, thanks to him, he could move forward with his separatist ambitions.
Dodik’s primary hope is that Trump will lift U.S. sanctions against him—a decision that could trigger a potentially irreversible crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serb leader aims to withdraw Republika Srpska from central institutions and unite it with Serbia.
Read also: XXX. Children of a Lesser Trump
U.S. disengagement from the Balkans seems almost like a foregone conclusion, but this does not mean that the Trump administration will not rely on some more like-minded interlocutors in the region. In this case, we are referring to Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbia.
Much will depend on the President-elect’s choices for key roles within his administration. If Richard Grenell, the former special envoy for the Serbia-Kosovo negotiations between 2019 and 2021, is confirmed for a senior position, it is highly likely that Washington will begin to openly favor Belgrade.
Even after Trump’s defeat in the 2020 U.S. presidential elections, Grenell continued to strengthen relations with Vučić. In recent months, he has reassured the Serbian President of ongoing diplomatic support despite a more restrained interventionist policy in the region.
The most significant consequence of this shift in foreign policy could be support for the prospect of a land swap between Belgrade and Pristina: the Preševo Valley (with an Albanian majority) to Kosovo, and the North Kosovo region (with a Serbian majority) to Serbia.
Grenell has long supported this plan, which was initially proposed during Trump’s first term and abandoned only due to strong opposition from Germany, a key player in the Western Balkans.
This scenario could prompt Vučić to freeze the EU-mediated normalization dialogue with Pristina, aiming to strengthen control over the contested areas. Kosovo’s sovereignty would thus be undermined, risking a new wave of tensions and clashes along one of the region’s most volatile borders.
A loose cannon
The experience of Trump’s first term does not leave EU partners feeling particularly comfortable.
After the positive balance achieved with the Democratic administration of Joe Biden in managing the most delicate situations—ranging from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Kosovo—everything could change with the likely disengagement of the Republican U.S. President-elect and support for Serbian nationalism.
In 2020, Trump and Grenell pushed for a “historic agreement” between Serbia and Kosovo of “economic peace”, that was not agreed upon with Brussels and did not address the root causes of the regional dispute. Four years later, an even more troubling scenario lies ahead.
This is why the European Commissioner-designate for Enlargement, Slovenian Marta Kos, made it clear in her confirmation hearing in the European Parliament that “we will never consider an exchange of territories” between Serbia and Kosovo, although “new ways” in the dialogue would be necessary “if things do not work out.”
A clear message addressed not only to Belgrade but also to the other side of the Atlantic.
Read also: S4E9. This is a tipping point
However, difficulties for the EU will also arise from the internal consequences that the Trump administration will inevitably unleash. In this case, we are referring to Viktor Orbán’s Hungary.
The Hungarian Prime Minister is Trump’s closest ally in Europe and a supporter of the Serbian nationalism embodied by Vučić and Dodik. It is easy to predict that Washington’s new foreign policy will favor Orbán’s political influence and sovereignist agenda in the Balkans.
The direct effect would be a strengthening of the Hungarian Prime Minister’s ability (thanks to his veto power) to shield Dodik from EU sanctions for his secessionist project, as well as Vučić’s Serbia from EU restrictive measures for obstacles to the implementation of agreements with Kosovo.
Another potential source of tension could emerge in North Macedonia. The new right-wing nationalist government opposes Brussels’ request (based on a written commitment) to amend the Macedonian Constitution to recognize the Bulgarian minority, effectively blocking EU accession negotiations.
In an attempt to renegotiate the agreement with Bulgaria—which was reached with great difficulty in July 2022—the government in Skopje may look to Trump as an alternative partner to the EU, and to Orbán as the ally who can undermine the constraints imposed by Brussels from within.
A risk of dark interests
The truth, as we said before, is that Trump cares only about himself—and at most, a small circle of loyalists. Perhaps this is where the focus should lie.
Even more so than during Tump’s first term, U.S. foreign policy could become a vast arena for private and family interests. The Balkans are no exception, despite the likely political disengagement.
The most striking example is the luxury development projects in Belgrade and on Albania’s Adriatic coast, announced in March 2024 by Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner.
In Belgrade, Kushner has proposed converting the former Yugoslav Ministry of Defence building—partially destroyed in 1999 by NATO bombings aimed at ending the war in Kosovo—into a complex featuring a luxury hotel, 1,500 residential units, and a museum “for the victims of NATO aggression.”
On the Albanian coast, luxury villas are planned in the Karaburun-Sazan Marine Park and the Vjosa-Narta Lagoon—both protected areas in the prefecture of Vlorë, in the southwest of the country—that have already been called ‘Trump villas.’
These projects had been under consideration even before Trump’s presidency in 2016. However, it was his first term as U.S. President that enabled his son-in-law to establish contacts with Serbian President Vučić and Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama, securing highly favorable terms for Kushner’s investment company Affinity Partners.
Read also: S4E7. Can we really trust Edi Rama?
The first piece of evidence is the nature of the agreement with the government of Serbia.
In exchange for a 99-year lease at no cost and without any open or transparent tender for the redevelopment of a site crucial to the national history, the Belgrade government would receive 22% of the profits generated by the project.
The second piece of evidence is the timing of the announcement for the project in Albania last March.
Despite opposition from the local population, the Parliament in Tirana passed a law allowing the government to grant building permits for luxury resorts in protected areas. Just days later, Affinity Partners announced its project for the ‘Trump villas’ in two protected areas on the Adriatic coast.
At the same time, the U.S. Senate launched an investigation into the projects of Kushner’s company, highlighting the risks of foreign influence on the investments of the President-elect’s family.
Foremost among these concerns is the fact that the governments of Serbia and Albania will have full control over decisions regarding permits, local taxes, and licenses. This raises the likelihood of high-level corruption in deals that blend public and private interests.
More importantly, Affinity Partners received investments of hundreds of millions of dollars from the sovereign wealth funds of the United Arab Emirates and Qatar in 2021, as well as two billion dollars from Saudi Arabia’s wealth fund.
In August 2026, in the midst of Trump’s presidential term, the first five-year investment period will end, allowing investors to renegotiate agreements or withdraw all their funds from Affinity Partners.
Foreign governments and entities could wield unprecedented influence over the finances of the current U.S. President’s family—“even beyond the influence they had and exercised in his first term,” the investigation warns.
When Trump re-enters the White House in January 2025, he will also control both chambers of Congress, thanks to the newly established Republican majority.
In this scenario, the consequences—both inside and outside the United States—are easy to foresee.
Read also: S2E30. The Super Sunday
Pit stop. Sittin’ at the BarBalkans
We have reached the end of this piece of the road.
Today at our bar, the BarBalkans, we revisit a red wine we have previously enjoyed: First Lady - Limited Edition, dedicated to Melania Trump, the Slovenian-born wife of the re-elected U.S. President.
This wine was first released in 2017 by Slovenian winemakers near Sevnica, the hometown of the first U.S. naturalized citizen to become first lady. In tribute, they crafted 300 limited edition bottles to celebrate her milestone.
Made from the region’s Blaufränkisch grapes, First Lady is a rich, tannic wine, boasting subtle acidity and a delicate cherry aroma.
The first bottles quickly sold out within three days. The wine’s popularity prompted the release of an additional 2,000 bottles, available at the Sevnica Castle souvenir shop and the village tourist office.
Read also: S4E13. Gastronationalism tastes like nothing
Let’s continue BarBalkans journey. We will meet again in two weeks, for the 8th stop of this season.
A big hug and have a good journey!
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